چکیده:
دیدگاههای مختلف در توجیه معرفتی ناگزیر از پاسخ به این پرسش اند که شناسا تحت چه شرایطی یک شاهد را داراست. سه دیدگاه مهم درباره چیستی داشتن شاهد میان معرفتشناسان وجود دارد: دیدگاه افراطی در داشتن شاهد، دیدگاه تفریطی در داشتن شاهد و دیدگاه میانهرو در داشتن شاهد. در این مقاله، در ضمنِ تبیین و ارزیابی ادلهی دیدگاههای سهگانه در داشتن شاهد، به این نظر میرسیم که از طرفی، دیدگاههای افراطی و تفریطی در داشتنِ شاهد قابل دفاع نیستند و از طرف دیگر، تقریری از دیدگاه میانهرو در داشتن شاهد قابل دفاع است. خواهیم دید که این دیدگاه از مشکلاتِ دیدگاههای رقیبش نیز مبرا است؛ از این رو، میتوانیم بنابر این دیدگاه در داشتن شاهد، معتقد شویم که p شاهدِ در دسترسِ شناسا مربوط به q در t است اگر و تنها اگر در t یا شناسا بالفعل از p آگاه باشد یا شناسا مستعدِ به یادآوری p هنگامی که تأمل درباره پرسش از صدقِ q میکند، باشد.
Introduction: Evidence in epistemology is good reasons that are
indicative of the truth concerning the proposition that is the object of
the doxastic attitude. We will see that believers in different views in
epistemic justification must answer the question of when a person has
good evidence. In this study, we seek to determine under what
circumstances a person has a evidence; In other words, the purpose of
this article is to explain and evaluate the views of epistemologists on
what having a evidence is. It seems that any view in which one's
evidence interferes with justification in any way must answer this
question. All epistemologists who believe in internalism in
justification must answer this question explicitly; Because all
internalist believe that epistemic justification depends on the evidence
one has. In my opinion, both foundationalists and Coherentists should
address this issue. In addition, some externalist theories of epistemic
justification also say that a person's belief is justified or reasonable if
it is based on evidence. So they also have to look at the circumstances
under which a person has a evidence.
Methodology: In this article, we first state what the characteristics
of an acceptable account of having a evidence should be. Then we will
mention the different account on this problem, then we will express
the arguments and problems they face and finally we will adopt an
acceptable account.
Finding: In this article, we examine the circumstances under which
a person has evidence. As we can see, among the three accounts of
evidence possession, the only one that can respond to its own
problems and yield the intuitively correct results is the MVP *
account. Therefore, this account is accepted in having a evidence. So,
from this point of view, in answer to the question of what it is like to
have a evidence, we can say that S has p available as evidence
relevant to q at t iff at t S is currently aware of p or S is disposed to
bring p to mind when reflecting on the question of q’s truth.
Conclusion: Different theories of epistemic justification are bound
to answer this question that under what conditions one has evidence.
There are three important views concerning the nature of possessing:
inclusive view of evidence possession, restrictive view of evidence
possession, moderate view of evidence possession. In this paper, we
come to this conclusion, after explanation and assessing reasons of
these three views about the nature of evidence, that on the one hand
inclusive and restrictive views of evidence possession are indefensible
and on the other hand an account of moderate view of evidence
possession is defensible. We will see that this view is also free from
the problems of its rival, so we can agree according to this view in
possessing evidence that S has p available as evidence relevant to q at
t iff at t S is currently aware of p or S is disposed to bring p to mind
when reflecting on the question of q’s truth .